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FOUR REPLIES
How do leaders of the financial industry view the nation's
capital needs? Spokesmen from commercial banking,
investment
banking, savings and loan, and insurance discuss the causes
and implications of a potential shortage and the problems
their industry faces in helping maintain a flourishing
economy.

COMMERCIAL BANKING:
THE TWIN THREATS TO CAPITAL
by W . L I D D O N McPETERS, President, A m e r i c a n Bankers Association
and President, Security Bank of C o r i n t h , Mississippi
The question of whether or not our
nation is heading for a capita! shortage is an exceedingly complex one. In
this issue of TEMPO, Dr. Freund deals
with the question in an especially
lucid way. The concerns which he has
expressed from his vantage point in
the securities industry are widely
shared in commercial banking.
About one-fourth of the total
credit outstanding in our economy
comes directly from the more than
14,000 banks in our nation's commercial banking system. Moreover, a significant amount of the credit provided
by several other types of lenders is
supported, in part, by bank loans and
commitments.
Commercial banking's contribution to the annual supply of new
credit fluctuates from year to year, of
course, but over a decade or so, it will
tend to expand its holdings of debt
securities and loans at about the same
pace that total debt has grown in our
economy.
10

Federal Fiscal Policy
This year-to-year fluctuation in the
volume of credit extended by commercial banks is primarily the result of
(1) changes in the demand for credit
by individuals, businesses, and governments and (2) shifts in Federal
Reserve monetary policy. The availability of bank credit depends on the
ease or tightness of the latter.
Dr. Freund's emphasis on the
important influence of the federal
government in determining whether
or not our nation may experience a
capital shortage is well placed. A
deficit in the federal budget has
important implications with respect
to the demand and supply of capital.
(1) A federal deficit tends to result
in a higher level of spending on
consumption than would exist if
federal revenues and expenditures
were in balance. That is, the total of
taxes and current savings is less than it
should be in relation to total income
in the economy. (2) In financing the

deficit, the federal government attracts funds away from capital formation in the private sector. Federal
deficits thus tend to reduce the
supply of capital, while at the same
time increasing the demand for it.
They have been a major source of
inflation in our economy.

The proper and principal use of
money is (he consumption
and
alienation of it, whereby it is
expended
in making
purchases.
Therefore, in itself, it is unlawful
to receive a price for the use of
money lent, which is called
—ST. THOMAS ACQUINAS

Because the anti-inflationary weapons of fiscal policy are usually politically unpalatable, the burden of
combatting inflation has fallen mainly
on Federal Reserve monetary policy.
The result has been recurrent periods
of tight money over the past 20 years.
Since this policy is implemented
largely by curtailing the expansion of
bank credit, the commercial banks
and their customers have been sub-

jected to recurrent swings in the
availability of credit. Such swings
have contributed to instability in the
pace of capital formation.
The most important step that can
be taken to help assure a stable pace
of capital growth is for the federal
government to put its fiscal house in
order. Budget deficits should be
permitted or encouraged only in
periods of recession. Conversely, and
w i t h total determination, budget
surpluses should be achieved in
periods of expansion.

Inflation
The 1974-1975 recession differed in at
least one important respect from the
other recessions that our economy
has experienced since the end of
W o r l d War II. In the fourth quarter of
1973, disposable personal income in
real terms stopped rising and began
to decline. The reason was that the
purchasing power of the dollar was
being eroded by inflation more
rapidly than the increase in number
of dollars received in after-tax personal income. This decline in real
purchasing power continued into
early 1975, and it was not until the
early months of 1976 that disposable
personal income in real terms regained the level of late 1973.
W h e n real purchasing power declines, it contributes directly to the
severity of a recession, since it
reduces the consumer's ability to take
goods off the market. This, in t u r n ,
weakens incentives for businesses to
expand plant and equipment. The
economy thus receives a sharp " o n e t w o " punch.
During previous postwar recessions, consumer spending was not
constrained by declines in personal
income. Indeed, expansion in consumer spending helped to bring the
recessions to an early end and to
encourage business spending on

plant and equipment. This balance
between consumption spending and
investment spending thus maintained
a capital formation commensurate
w i t h our nation's requirements. This
balance was disrupted by the 19731974 inflation and ensuing recession.
In part, the present concern about
a future capital shortage in our nation
reflects the fact that an appropriate
balance
between
consumption
spending and investment spending
has not yet been restored. As Dr.
Freund has indicated, continuing
expansion in consumption spending,
with the currently relatively low level
of investment spending, implies that
" b o t t l e n e c k s " will sooner or later be
encountered in the production of
goods and services. Economic recovery could thus be disrupted.
The commercial banking system is
fully capable of playing its well established role as a major supplier of
credit to individuals, businesses, and
governments. There is strong evi-

dence that the trend toward greater
reliance on savings and time deposits
as a future source of deposit growth
in commercial banks will continue.
However, the commercial banks do
ask when they will be freed from the
competitive disadvantage of the
savings account interest rate differentials imposed by federal law and
regulation. Until then, they will
achieve less than their potential as
suppliers of credit.
We need more incentives for
expanding our industrial capacity.
The need goes beyond short-term
policy measures. What is needed is a
clear assurance that our economy is
again on a steady growth path.
The capital requirements of our
economy over the coming decade
are, indeed, very large. A n d while I
believe our economy has the capacity
to meet t h e m , I find that the greatest
threat to our nation's ability to meet
its capital requirements is irresponsible federal fiscal policy and inflation.

INVESTMENT BANKING:
THE RESTRAINTS ON CAPITAL
by ROBERT M . F O M A N , President and C h i e f Executive O f f i c e r ,
E.F. H u t t o n & C o . , Inc.

Will there be a capital shortage? The
issues are complex. Certainly an
actual capital shortage will be more a
function of economics and politics
than of anything the securities industry does or does not do. Indeed, the
assumptions underlying the capital
shortage thesis are being challenged
by serious thinkers. The economists
w h o raised the question may have

created another one of those economictrendsthathave n o w h e r e t o g o .
Capital shortage or not, investments which are attractive in relation
to the prevailing economic and social
environment will attract investors.
The key issues center not on security
industry resources, but rather on the
elimination of those forces which
dampen returns and increase uncer11
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tainty, thereby reducing the attractiveness of investments.
For example, many companies now
invest fewer total dollars because
they have raised their rate-of-return
requirements. These requirements
had to be raised to adjust for the
effects of inflation, economic uncertainty, and political ambiguity. However, while the increasing rate-ofreturn requirement eliminates low
return investments and reduces the
capital shortage problem, if indeed
there is one, it certainly does not
bode well for our economy.
Moreover, much current investment spending is either
nonproductive or marginally productive. For example, the government
mandated "quality of l i f e " investments. Less of what we call capital in-

The theologians,
approaching
the question
from a legal
point
of view, made it possible for the
bankers to invest their
money
profitably
by switching
from
lending to exchange. . . . Since a
c a m b i u m (exchange
contract)
was not a straight loan, there was
no usury
involved.
—RAYMOND DE ROOVER

vestment is now capital investment in
the classical sense. Some observers
estimate that these mandated investments comprise as much as 25 percent of the total.
An overriding concern of the investment w o r l d is that the social consequences of, for example, greater
unemployment—resulting from lower total investment—will focus undue
attention on dealing with symptoms
rather than on the fundamental eco12

nomic and political environment that
is required for our system to work.
Nobody, however, has yet figured out
how to satisfy both capital and labor
with this trade-off.
Nevertheless, whatever the environment, vast amounts of permanent capital will be required by
American industry over the next
decade, and the main responsibility
for raising it belongs to the investment banking/brokerage community.
America's ability to raise permanent private capital for industry is
clearly the best in the w o r l d ; it has
enabled this nation to continue to
outpace its competitors in economic
and industrial growth for decades.
Helping to maintain this economic
superiority has been the fact that the
investor, whether individual or instit u t i o n , is far more likely to invest his
funds in a corporation if he is secure
in the knowledgethatthere will bean
active, stable market into which he
can sell in the future. O u r capitalraising process depends upon the
liquidity of such a secondary market.
The Institutional Investor
The ever-increasing activity of the
institutional investor in the equity
markets, combined with the legislated restrictions recently imposed on
managers of pension monies by
ERISA, have caused fundamental
changes in this market. Pension f u n d
managers must follow extremely conservative courses in selecting investments, lest they run afoul of the ERISA
laws. Investment results themselves
become almost less important than
being able to defend one's actions.
Consequently, institutional investments have tended, in the equity
markets, to go only to those stocks
which are conservative, liquid, wellk n o w n , and owned by other institutions. This tendency reduces the
ability of small and medium-sized

companies to gain market recognit i o n , w h i c h , in t u r n , reduces their
ability to finance growth through the
selling of equity. Unfortunately, these
same companies are too small for the
public debt markets. They also lack
sufficient influence in periods of tight
money, like 1974, to depend upon
commercial banks to fulfill their
financial needs.
The Individual Investor
Another major source of capital, the
individual investor, believing that his
money will be safer and more productive in the same havens chosen by
the well-publicized institutions, has
gone more and more toward the
same kinds of equity securities. The
result for the smaller company is less
liquidity and fewer investors—not a
good atmosphere for emerging c o m panies to raise and attract investment
capital.
This same individual investor,
whose individual decisions aggregate to make our capital markets
vastly superior to those of other
countries, has other factors working
against his willingness to invest d i rectly in corporate America. Most of
these factors result from congressional and executive branch actions.
First, the tax structure, which has
always favored capital investment, is
now undergoing reforms, many of
which disfavor capital investment. For
example, the 1976 tax legislation
extends the holding period that is required to qualify for long-term capital
gains treatment. Further, the Democrats have suggested doing away with
the capital gains tax treatment and
taxing all capital gains, long or short
term, as unearned income. Each of
these changes will make equity i n vestment by individuals less attractive, just w h e n more rather than less
individual investment is required.
Moreover, the constant p r o m u l -

gation of more complex accounting
policies by the accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange
Commission has bewildered the
unsophisticated investor to the point
where he is unable to understand
corporate financial statements. The
changes, which were made in the
interest of greater disclosure, have
resulted in a plethora of " n o n recurring" gains and losses, balance
sheets whose footnotes are far lengthier than the financial statements
themselves, and income statements
whose true meaning is often hidden
somewhere between the lines. The
investor understands good news and
he understands bad news, but what
he cannot understand at all he is likely
to avoid altogether.
For these and other reasons, there

has been a noticeable shrinkage in
the number of total individual shareholders in this country since 1968. If
this element of our capital formation
process deteriorates further, the
problems of raising sufficient capital
over the next decade, as enumerated
by Dr. Freund and other economists,
may, indeed, become a problem.
Even with the alleged capital shortage, however, the giant corporations
of this nation will retain their access to
sufficient capital for their needs,
though at times it may be very expensive. As the institutional pools of
capital continue to grow, through
increasing pension contributions and
an already evident return to more
normal saving patterns, these funds
will be put to work primarily through
debt and equity investment in the

largest and "safest" corporations.
Whether the other significant parts
of our capitalist system, the small and
medium-sized corporations, will be
able to finance growth will depend
primarily on the attitudes of individual investors. Constant publicity of
corporate indiscretions, tax legislation favoring consumption over investment, bewildering financial statements, and gyrating, unpredictable
markets are slowly destroying the i n dividual's confidence in the process.
Whether we can regain this confidence depends primarily on the attitudes and actions of our government. Congress and the President can
bring the individual investor back.
They should. We need him now, and
we will need him even more in the
years to come.

SAVINGS AND LOAN:
THE COMPETITION FOR AVAILABLE CAPITAL

o

by Preston M a r t i n , President a n d C h i e f Executive O f f i c e r , P M I M o r t g a g e I n s u r a n c e C o .
In his provocative article, William
Freund points out that, while the
recession has eased current capital
requirements, savings flowing into
corporations through bond and stock
purchases may be insufficient to f u n d
required capital expenditures.
In that event, housing will be
competing with corporations for
available savings in both the capital
markets, through the issuance of
mortgage-backed
securities
and
bonds, and the real estate oriented
savings institutions, through passbook and certificate savings. M o r e over, housing will also compete for
personal savings through d o w n pay-

ments for
homeownership
and
through the accompanying "issuance" of mortgage debt to these same
home purchasers.

Competing Against Corporations
How well will housing be able to
compete in the next 10 years? Let us
look first at mortgage-backed securities. In the late 1960's, federal housing
policy officials examined housing
finance markets and f o u n d that
mortgages were becoming increasingly unattractive to institutional
investors compared to corporate
bonds and stock. The mortgage was

costly to originate, service, and
foreclose. Courts were increasingly
emphasizing
borrower
rights—
sometimes even when contrary to the
mortgage contract. Payments were in
cumbersome denominations (e.g.
$257.83 per month), included a b o t h ersome monthly return of principal,
were for a long contractual maturity
w i t h an unpredictable probability of
prepayment, and had a fixed interest
rate.
Is it any wonder that the pension
fund or insurance company investment manager preferred to place a
call to his investment broker for $1
million of publicly traded corporate
13
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bonds or to negotiate a high yielding
private placement—perhaps with an
equity kicker—or to buy common
stock offering the prospect of both
current dividend and price appreciation? As these diversified investors
withdrew, the home mortgage market was increasingly left to savings
and loan associations and mutual
savings banks. By the late 1960's, many
mortgage bankers were finding that
Fannie Mae (The Federal National
Mortgage Association) moved from
being their best customer to being
their only customer.
The solution arrived at since 1969
has been to make the mortgage look
as much like a corporate bond as
possible. First, the Federal Home
Loan Banks began to sell large v o l umes of consolidated obligations. In
t u r n , these banks began to encourage their 4,000 plus members, mostly
savings and loans, to borrow for
expansion of their mortgage lending.
Then Congress authorized the creation of the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation in 1970. The
Mortgage Corporation (also called
Freddie Mac) and Fannie Mae undertook a landmark assignment, to
create a uniform mortgage instrument. The Mortgage Corporation and Fannie M a e began to issue
bonds backed by the cash flows from
pools of mortgages. The ability to
service these bonds was guaranteed
by the Government National M o r t gage Association (Ginnie Mae). G i n nie Mae also guaranteed securities
issued by mortgage originators,
where interest and principal were
passed through to the investor,
beginning in 1970.
The Mortgage Corporation sold,
through Wall Street, participations in
the whole loans and mortgages which
it held—also beginning in 1970. The
Mortgage Corporation issued its
Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates
14

beginning in 1975. The GMCs are
specifically designed to make the
institutional investment manager feel
all the comfort and convenience of
owning a bond yet having the proceeds f u n d home mortgages. They
are guaranteed by an issuer (The
Mortgage Corporation) which is
affiliated with the Federal Home Loan
Bank System.
Then, in 1975, the first public
offering of a mortgage-backed bond
by a savings and loan association
came to market. As this was taking
place, the old prohibitions against

W e , the trustees of the sacred
Monte della Pieta of Naples,
certify that we hold on deposit in
the said sacred bank to the credit
of Lucretia da Beneme
thirteen
ducats which we guarantee
will
be paid to any party
designated
by her order at the bottom
of
this instrument,
subject only to
the return of this
instrument
signed in her hand and sealed
with the accustomed
seal of the
said sacred
bank.
—A CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, 1574

originating or buying mortgages
beyond 50 miles of the home office
were removed for savings and loans
and mutual savings banks. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
secured an IRS ruling facilitating the
sale of mortgages while preserving
the savings and loan tax status. Thus,
encouraged, lenders began to trade
mortgages and mortgage loan participations. Mortgage bankers began
to replace their lost insurance c o m pany correspondents with new sav-

ings and loan clients. Mortgage rates
and mortgage funds availability began to behave as in a national market
rather than a plethora of local markets. All of which helped make
mortgages and
mortgage-backed
securities again competitive with
corporate securities.
Competing for Personal Savings
The credit crunch of 1969-70 convinced federal regulators of financial
institutions and the savings officers of
these institutions that the saving
public was discovering Treasury bills
and government and corporate
bonds.
But just as there needed to be a
product for the institutional investor
which kept funds in mortgagerelated securities, there needed to be
a product which w o u l d keep savings
on deposit in mortgage lending institutions—a product to stem disintermediation. The 6 percent interest, 2
year m i n i m u m maturity, $1,000 m i n i mum denomination certificate was
introduced in 1969 to savings and
loans (with commercial banks being
authorized to pay 5% percent).
The response must be judged as
excellent. Since that time there have
been authorized a whole series of
certificates, ranging up to 7VA percent
interest. Of the $295 billion on
deposit in savings and loans as of
March 31,1976, fully 55 percent was in
certificates—an amazing conversion
in just over six years. The saving
public has now fully accepted a
federally insured certificate in a local
thrift institution, with a specified
maturity and penalty for early red e m p t i o n , that offers a good substitute for Treasury securities and corporate bonds.
A Look Ahead
What types of mortgage and savings
product changes might occur be-

tween now and 1985 to help compete
with the corporate securities market?
• Relatively soon, there are likely
to be numerous pools of conventional mortgages, privately insured
and meeting pre-described standards, which m a y w e l l b e o p e n e n d e d .
Pool administrators will buy mortgages and issue debt a n d / o r participations, like The Mortgage Corporation now does. In some cases, thrift
institutions will join together in
offering mortgages to a given pool.
Some pools will contain only variable
rate mortgages; some will have low
interest rate mortgages at deep
discounts; some will have short
remaining contract maturity or high
probability of prepayment; and some
will offer the individual investor the
opportunity to buy or sell at net asset
value, plus transaction costs—a mortgage mutual f u n d .
• There will be much experimentation with mortgages for young
families whose income is expected to
rise. These will take the form of
variable payments, variable balances, lines of credit mortgages, cost
of living mortgages, share of equity

mortgages, and so on. For those
retiring with limited ability to make
rising property tax and maintenance
payments, there will be housing annuities and perhaps sale-leaseback
financing.
O n the savings side of the business,
the success of certificates and the
recent major moves by Congress to
permit tax-deferred, individually tailored pension plans will cause much
new product development in savings
instruments. Examples might be:
• A certificate which pays a higher
rate each year and that is held. Such
an account in the name of an entire family might encourage cooperative family saving, withdrawal by
some family members on approval of
the others, periodic gifting f r o m
those in high tax brackets to those in
low brackets, and loans for home
purchases f r o m the family savings
pool at whatever rate the family wants
to charge its members.
• Certificates with variable interest
rates. In some states, there is a convenient flow from savings to checking
account (or N O W account) to overdrafting into a loan posture. O n the

West Coast, at least one institution
permits using the equity building up
in one's home, as a result of a loan
amortization and price appreciation,
as a quasi-savings account with easy
borrowing of that equity.
• Counselor selling. While some
bemoan the issuance of low m i n i mum denomination debt by government and fight to maintain spreads
between accounts of competing
types of thrift institutions, there
appears to be plenty of room to
attract personal savings by finding out
what the customer's problem is and
then helping him or her solve it.
Dr. Freund says there may be a
capital shortage. If so, it w o u l d appear
clear that thrift institutions and the
housing market need not simply let
corporations get all the savings they
need at the expense of housing.
Mr. Martin, former chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(1969-1972) and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance
Corporation
(1969-1972) was assisted in the
preparation of this article by
R. Bruce Ricks.

INSURANCE: THE COST OF FINANCING CAPITAL.
by D O N A L D S. M a c N A U G H T O N , C h a i r m a n , C h i e f Executive O f f i c e r , P r u d e n t i a l I n s u r a n c e C o . of A m e r i c a
Recent studies of the supply of capital
have come full circle f r o m the years
after W o r l d War II. Then, the predominant fear was that the supply of
savings might be uncomfortably large
relative to the demand for investment. Now, the earlier concern that
aggregate demand might fall back to
depression levels, if the government
did not stimulate consumption rela-

tive t o saving, has been replaced by
fears that government policies have
so stimulated consumption at the
expense of saving that a capital
shortage is in prospect.
The consequences of this "capital
g a p " are high interest rates that
continue to rise and a short-fall in
sorely needed investment. The result
is slower economic growth, increas-

ing inflation and rising unemployment in the years ahead. However,
given today's conflicting
evidence
and interpretations
it is difficult
to
judge whether or not such a capital
shortage is likely during the next few
years and beyond. A n d exaggeration
of the capital gap idea can detract
from thoughtful analysis and lead
perhaps to adverse policy reactions.
15
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Three Criteria
There are three aspects of the capital
formation issue that deserve attention. O n e is to distinguish more
clearly between putting needed
physical capital in place and supplying the funds needed to finance
capital additions—that is, to draw a
clear distinction between a physical
capital shortage and a financial capital
shortage. This distinction is important
because some commentators fear
that the falling rate of return on the
nation's invested capital may be a
greater threat to future capital spending than a shortage of financing.
A physical capital shortage (and a
declining rate of return on investment capital) might result from a
variety of causes: (1) reduced productivity of capital stock reflecting
the relatively advanced age of existing plants, the greater investment
required for each barrel of offshore
oil, and the added costs to meet
pollution control and health and
safety requirements; (2) excessive
government regulation in such areas
as apartment rents and oil and natural
gas production and distribution; or
(3) local resistance to investment in,
say, electric generating plants.
Second, even when the analysis is
limited to the financial capital shortage, the " g a p " approach encounters
formidable forecasting difficulties.
The potential errors become quite
large as the outlook period is extended, and even the most skilled
forecasters are frustrated by changing
consumer moods that affect future
household savings. The capital shortage models, further, may not give
sufficient recognition to demandsupply adjustments mandated by the
operation of our price system. For
example, the energy crisis reduced
electric power demands and already
has caused reassessment of investment requirements for electric gen16

erating capacity. Also, it is hard to
separate the " o b j e c t i v e " forecast
from the subjective social goals of the
forecaster—i.e., the proper allocation of resources to investment versus
consumption and to private versus
public sectors.
Finally, with respect to availability
of financing, it seems to me that
closing the " g a p " through excessive
debt financing should cause as much
concern, if not more, than the size of
the projected capital gap. This issue is
central to the increasing fragility of
our financial system since the m i d 1960s. From the vantage point of the
life insurance industry and our function as financial intermediaries involved in making long-term financial
investments, the mix, as well as the
amount, of future financial demand
has an overwhelming significance.
Defining the Term
In my view, a capital shortage is best
defined as a situation that emerges
when a lack of physical investment
prevents the economy from achieving and maintaining full employment
at stable prices, and/or when the
necessary flow of funds to finance
capital investment is not f o r t h coming at reasonably stable rates of
interest. This latter case of a financial
capital shortage produces a high and
variable interest rate structure; and it
results in a " c r o w d i n g o u t " of some
key economic sectors—for example,
the newer and smaller businesses
which contribute to the innovative
and competitive character of the
economy. Indeed, with such debt
burdens
increasing—characterized
by high debt-equity ratios and acrossthe-board weakening in the quality of
corporate balance sheets—the economy is less resilient and less likely to
cope with either periodic external
shocks or sudden severe shifts in
internal economic policies.

Defining a capital shortage in this
way avoids the problems inherent in
trying to quantify a so-called "capital
gap." In these exercises, a big shortfall almost inevitably develops, because available future financing is
almost sure to be much less than a
shopping list of the nation's investment
aspirations.
Indeed,
this
broader definition of the problem
also emphasizes the point that the
size of the projected capital gap is not
nearly as important as are its implications for the future structure of
interest rates and rates of inflation. As
Dr. Freund points out, in actuality no
such gap will occur, since prices and
interest rates will move in a direction
that will equilibrate the supply of and
the demand for funds. What is
important is to relate the projections
of the capital shortfall with the
implied interest rate and price structure that will eliminate this gap. In

In order to
remedy
inconveniences
[of
counterfeit
coins], a [public]
bank was
established
in 7609 under
the
guarantee
of the City [of
Amsterdam].
This bank
received
both foreign coins, and the light
worn coin of the country at its
real intrinsic
value in the good
standard money of the
country.
. . . It was at the same
time enacted that all bills
drawn
upon or negotiated
at
Amsterdam
of the value of 600
guilders and upwards should
be
paid in bank money, which at
once took away all uncertainty
in
the value of those
bills.
—ADAM SMITH

brief, to assess the seriousness of a
shortfall
requires
determining
whether or not the costs of financing
increase too rapidly to insure financial and economic stability,
and/or
whether financing costs reach levels
that are too high to maintain a fully
employed labor force at stable prices.
Going beyond definitions, there is
sufficient evidence based on past
economic performance to be c o n cerned about the capital shortage
problem. Based on my o w n c o m pany's experience as a major lender
of long-term funds, I am struck by the
seemingly
huge capital
outlays
needed for achieving normal expansion, as well as for replacing outmoded and inefficient facilities,
developing new sources of raw
materials and energy, preserving the
natural
environment,
improving
worker safety, and expanding agricultural production. I am also impressed,
however, by the host of questions
that challenge alarmist views and that
have yet to be fully resolved. For
example, while the dollar magnitudes
of investment necessary to fully
employ our labor force seem to be
enormous, does the apparent declining rate of return on capital suggest
that we have on hand an excessive
amount of capital stock in certain
industries? Many have argued that
economic policy seems to favor
consumption over investment, which
carries the implication that government policy will hamper the financing of needed investment projects.
How is this position reconciled with
the fact that personal saving rates
throughout the 1970's have been at
historically high levels?
Proponents of the capital shortage
thesis have argued that increasing
shares of GNP must go for investment; otherwise as the economy
expands, capacity constraints will be
reached too quickly, once again

/ have the honor to transmit
an
ordinance
passed by the
United
States in Congress assembled
the
31st day of December,
1781,
incorporating
the subscribers
of
the Bank of North America.
. . .
It affords me great satisfaction
to
inform you that this [first
national]
Bank commenced
its
operations
yesterday.
—ROBERT MORRIS

setting off inflation pressures. But, to
what extent can we rely on our
financial system to find new ways to
shift capital to growth areas (such as
energy requirements) where investment needs are greatest?
New Research Projects
It should be evident that the concept
of a capital shortage and the empirical
evidence brought to bear on the issue
are sufficiently complex to require
an in-depth analysis which is beyond
the purpose of this article. I w o u l d
note, however, that the life insurance
industry, through its Investment
Research Program conducted by the
American Council of Life Insurance,
anticipated the current concern
about capital formation. In 1973, it
commissioned a New York University
group to project demand and supply
conditions in the US capital markets
out to 1985. The full results of this
study will soon be available, but
preliminary indications show that a
number of "pressure points" will
build up over the next decade.
This work has led to a more recent
comprehensive research effort, sponsored by the industry, t o deal with the
basic determinants of and motiva-

tions for capital formation and saving.
This is an ambitious project. It will
examine the nation's commitment to
economic growth as necessary background in formulating capital investment and savings requirements; it
will investigate the roles of government, business, and private savings in
the capital formation process.
This article has dealt with technical
aspects of the capital shortage question. There are obviously national
policy considerations also involved.
In this regard, I feel there is a pressing
need to recognize that economic
growth through private investment
and savings is as much a national
priority as are the more politically
popular human concerns of income
security, income redistribution, c o n sumer rights, environmental safeguards and
h e a l t h care
and
maintenance—which have been the
driving force in the rising share of
government in the economy.
Also, it is important to recognize
that the inevitable trade-offs that
have to be made among these
competing priorities will most likely
be the final determinants of the
relative seriousness of our capital
formation problem. In its concern for
the well-being of the nation, government must not allow the sheer
volume and m o m e n t u m of socially
mandated programs to make severe
inroads into the rate of capital
formation in the private sector. In
t u r n , private borrowers and lenders
must face up to their responsibility to
allocate scarce capital to useful
purposes and to avoid wasteful
ventures and frivolous products.
Economist Paul McCracken summed up the broad policy implications
of the problem by saying: "The future
can and will be financed. O u r task is
to improve the probability that the
future we finance is the future
citizens generally w a n t . "
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